Testing theories of temporal inferences: Evidence from child language by Cremers, Alexandre et al.
Testing theories of temporal inferences:
Evidence from child language *
Alexandre Cremers
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Frances Kane
Ulster University
Lyn Tieu
Western Sydney University &
Macquarie University
Lynda Kennedy
Ulster University
Yasutada Sudo
UCL
Raﬀaella Folli
Ulster University
Jacopo Romoli
Ulster University
Abstract Sentences involving past tense verbs, such as My dogs were on the
carpet, tend to give rise to the inference that the corresponding present tense
version, My dogs are on the carpet, is false. This inference is often referred to
as a ‘cessation’ or ‘temporal’ inference, and is generally analyzed as a type of
implicature (Thomas 2012; Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013; Musan 1995; Ma-
gri 2009; 2011; Sudo & Romoli 2017). In the literature, there are two main
proposals for capturing this asymmetry: one assumes a diﬀerence in informa-
tivity between the past and present counterparts mentioned above (Altshuler &
Schwarzschild 2013), while the other proposes a structural diﬀerence between the
two (Thomas 2012). The two approaches are similar in terms of their empirical
coverage, but they diﬀer in the predictions they make for language acquisition.
We used a novel animated picture selection paradigm (building on Katsos &
Bishop 2011) to investigate the predictions of the two approaches to temporal
inferences. Specifically, we compared the performance of a group of 4–6-year-
old children and a group of adults on temporal inferences, the "not all" scalar
implicature of the quantifier "some", and inferences of adverbial modifiers under
negation. The results of our experiment revealed that overall, children computed
all three inference types at a lower rate than the adult controls, however they
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were more adult-like on temporal inferences and on the inferences of adverbial
modifiers than on the scalar implicature of “some”. We discuss the implications
of the findings, both for a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis, which
posits that children’s diﬃculties with certain implicatures arise from a diﬃculty
in accessing the required lexical alternatives (e.g., Barner et al. 2011; Tieu
et al. 2016; 2017; Singh et al. 2016), as well as theories of temporal inferences,
arguing that the finding that children were more (and equally) adult-like on tem-
poral inferences and adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory of temporal
inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012).
Keywords: temporal inferences, cessation implicatures, scalar implicatures, adverbial
modifiers, alternatives-based hypothesis, language acquisition, semantics, pragmatics
1 Introduction
Sentences involving past tense verbs like (1a) tend to give rise to the inference
that the corresponding present tense sentence (2a) is false. By contrast, present
tense sentences like (2a) do not suggest that the corresponding past tense version
(1a) is false.1
(1) a. My dogs were in the basket.
b.  My dogs aren’t in the basket
(2) a. My dogs are in the basket.
b. 6 My dogs weren’t in the basket
The inference in (1b) is generally referred to as a ‘cessation’ or ‘temporal’ inference.
It is typically analyzed as a type of scalar implicature, arising through a comparison
between (1a) and its alternative in (2a) (Musan 1995; Magri 2009; 2011; Altshuler
& Schwarzschild 2013; Thomas 2012; Sudo & Romoli 2017).
There are two main proposals in the literature for capturing the asymmetry
between the sentences in (1a) and (2a). The first is based on the assumption
1 A similar situation arises in the case of future sentences like (i) and their present tense counterparts,
i.e. (ii). In order to set aside the potential complications involving the contribution of will (see
Santorio & Romoli To appear and references therein), we will focus on past tense sentences like (1).
(i) a. My dogs will be in the basket.
b.  My dogs aren’t in the basket (yet)
(ii) a. My dogs are in the basket.
b. 6 My dogs will not be in the basket
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that the two sentences diﬀer in their informativity; we will refer to this approach
as the SEMANTIC approach. This approach argues that a present tense sentence
like (2a) entails its past counterpart in (1a). This, in turn, predicts that when
(2a) is uttered, its alternative, (1a) cannot be negated as it is entailed by the
assertion itself (Altshuler & Schwarzschild 2013). An alternative analysis of the
asymmetry above, which we will refer to as the STRUCTURAL approach, assumes
a structural diﬀerence between a present tense sentence and its past counterpart.
On this latter approach, a sentence like (1) is logically independent from a sentence
like (2), but the former is more complex – and in fact structurally contains – the
latter (Thomas 2012). This assumption, in combination with a structural theory
of alternatives (Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011; Trinh & Haida 2015), results in
(2) being an alternative of (1) but not vice versa. This in turn correctly predicts
that (2) cannot have the negation of (1) as an inference.
The two approaches share assumptions regarding the semantics of the present
and past tense sentences, as well as the idea that temporal inferences are a type of
implicature; they thus have similar empirical coverage, for example capturing the
asymmetry between (1a) and (2a). One crucial point of divergence between the
two analyses, however, is that they make diﬀerent developmental predictions. In
particular, as we argue below, only the structural approach, in combination with
a recent alternatives-based hypothesis concerning the acquisition of implicatures,
predicts that children should be more adult-like on temporal inferences compared
to more traditional implicatures.
The present study tests this prediction by comparing the performance of 4–6-
year-old children and adults on sentences like (1). We developed a novel ‘group’
selection task based on Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3) and tested children
and adults on temporal inferences, scalar implicatures, and inferences arising from
adverbial modification in negative sentences. The main finding was that children
were more adult-like in their derivation of temporal inferences and inferences arising
from adverbial modification in negative sentences than in their derivation of the
not all implicature of “some”. We argue that the observed pattern of performance
is predicted by Thomas’s (2012) theory of temporal inferences, combined with
a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis for scalar inferences (such as the
Restricted Alternatives Hypothesis proposed in Tieu et al. 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the
two approaches to temporal inferences in more detail. In Section 3, we introduce
the lexical alternatives-based hypothesis concerning the acquisition of implicatures.
In Section 4 we discuss the case of negated adverbial modifiers and in Section 5, we
outline the experimental predictions for temporal inferences and inferences arising
from negated adverbial modifiers. In Section 6, we present our experiment and in
Section 7 we discuss the results in the context of the theories and their predictions.
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2 Two theories of temporal inferences
As outlined in Section 1, there are two main proposals for explaining the asymmetry
between past tense sentences like (1a) and present tense sentences like (2a). The
SEMANTIC approach is based on informativity, while the STRUCTURAL approach
is based on structural diﬀerences between the two sentences. We outline some
common assumptions of the two approaches below before discussing each in greater
detail.
2.1 Common assumptions
Under both approaches, a semantics for present and past sentences along the lines
of (3) and (4) is assumed (where time(c) represents the time of utterance in the
given context):2
(3) JMy dogs were in the basketKc =
9t[t < time(c)^ in-the-basket(my-dogs)(t)]
(4) JMy dogs are in the basketKc =
9t[time(c) 2 t ^ in-the-basket(my-dogs)(t)]
In the absence of additional assumptions, the meanings in (3) and (4) make the
two sentences logically independent: the first simply tells us that there is a time
prior to the utterance time in which my dogs were in the basket. This leaves open
whether they are in the basket at a time that includes the utterance time, which
corresponds to the conditions under which (4) is true. Conversely, (4) merely says
that there is a time that includes the utterance time in which my dogs are in the
basket. It leaves open whether there was a time beforehand in which they were in
the basket.
In addition, under both approaches, the temporal inference arising from (3)
should be analyzed as a type of implicature. The main argument for this approach
to temporal inferences comes from the fact that, like standard scalar implicatures,
temporal inferences are easily cancellable. The scalar implicature of “some” in (5),
for example, is easily cancelled:
(5) John met some of his students yesterday, in fact he met all of them.
2 This is the semantics assumed in Sudo & Romoli (2017). The semantics assumed by Thomas (2012)
and Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) differ slightly but not in a crucial way for our purposes. The
most important difference is with respect to the assumption about stative predicates that we describe
below, which changes the entailment relation between (3) and (4). We return to this in the next
subsection.
Testing theories of temporal inferences 5
The temporal inference arising from (6) can likewise be cancelled when followed
by “. . . and they still are”, without incurring a contradiction.
(6) My dogs were in the basket.
(7) My dogs are in the basket.
Let us briefly sketch how the implicature from (6) to the negation of (7) is derived.
We will illustrate this using a simplified Gricean algorithm for scalar implicatures,
acknowledging however that any theory of scalar implicatures that includes the
characteristics below will be compatible with the implicature approaches we have
mentioned.3 The basic idea is that rational interactions between conversational
participants are guided by general principles of co-operation (see Grice 1975 and
much subsequent work). In particular, the assumption is that upon hearing an
utterance, the hearer will reason about what the speaker might have said instead,
with various assumptions about what led the speaker to say what she said rather
than something else. Among these assumptions, the one that is relevant here is the
assumption that the speaker is being as informative as is required. The fact that
the speaker chose to assert what they did and not something else (among a set of
restricted relevant competitors) leads the hearer to conclude that the competitors
that are not already entailed by the assertion must be false.4 Therefore in the case
of temporal inferences, assuming that (6) and (7) are competitors, upon hearing
the sentence in (6) the hearer will conclude that the speaker must think that (7)
is false, thereby deriving the desired temporal inference that my dogs are not in
the basket. This follows the simplified gricean algorithm in (8):
(8) The speaker said A.
The speaker could have said B instead (but didn’t).
It is false that B.
A problem arises, however, given the assumed literal meanings provided in (3)
and (4) and the reasoning provided above, namely, we should expect to derive an
implicature from (7) that is the negation of (6). That is, we would incorrectly
predict from (7) the inference that my dogs were not in the basket (before). Yet,
as we have observed, only (6) gives rise to a temporal inference involving the
negation of (7). This is where the two theoretical approaches diverge.
3 Notice in particular that at least for Thomas (2012), the theory has to be one in which implicatures
are derived not only on the basis of stronger alternatives but also on logically independent ones.
4 More precisely, the hearer will conclude that it is not true that the speaker believes that the stronger
competitors are true, which, given other assumptions, can be strengthened to the speaker’s belief
that the competitors are false, and even further to the competitors actually being false. See Gamut
(1991) for discussion.
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Under the SEMANTIC approach, the asymmetry between (6) and (7) is derived
by assuming diﬀerences in the semantic relationships between the two sentence
types. On the other hand, the STRUCTURAL approach derives the asymmetry
by making additional assumptions regarding the syntactic structures of the two
sentences, in combination with a theory of scalar competitors that is sensitive to
the syntactic structure. In the next subsections, we outline the two approaches
and their diﬀerences in greater detail. We then turn to the diﬀerent developmental
predictions they make, which constitute the motivation for the experiment we
present in Section 6.
2.2 The semantic approach
As discussed above, without additional assumptions, the literal meanings of (6) and
(7) are logically independent. Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) argue, however,
that (7) actually entails (6), once the following assumption is made:
(9) Temporal profiles of statives: If a tenseless stative clause f is true at
moment m, then there is a moment m0 preceding m at which that f is
true.
And indeed, it is easy to see that if we assume (9), then it follows that (7) is
stronger than (6): this is because if there is a time which includes the utterance
time at which my dogs are in the basket, then on the basis of (9), there must be a
moment prior to that time (and henceforth prior to the utterance time), in which
my dogs were in the basket. This automatically makes (6) true. The opposite
does not hold, of course: there can be a time prior to the utterance time in which
my dogs were in the basket, without there being a time including the utterance
time in which they still are in the basket. In sum, given the assumption in (9),
Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013) argue that (7) asymmetrically entails (6). This,
in turn, in combination with a theory of implicature as sketched above, correctly
predicts that the former cannot have the negation of the latter as an implicature,
because the latter is entailed by the former.
In other words, for Altshuler & Schwarzschild (2013), the asymmetry between
past and present sentences is based on in the entailment relation between them.
In the next subsection we turn to an alternative approach proposed by Thomas
(2012), which involves a very diﬀerent way of obtaining the asymmetry between
present and past sentences.
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2.3 The structural approach
There exists an alternative to the semantic approach discussed above that does not
involve the assumption in (9). According to Thomas (2012), a present sentence
and its past counterpart remain logically independent and cannot be distinguished
by informativity as per the semantic approach. This, in combination with a theory
of implicatures that allows implicatures to arise from alternatives that are logically
independent from the assertion, would correctly predict the target temporal infer-
ence from the past sentence to the negation of the present counterpart, but it
would also incorrectly derive a corresponding temporal inference from the present
tense sentence to the negation of the past counterpart. To address this issue,
Thomas (2012), building on an observation in Dowty (1979), argues that the two
sentences are structurally distinct. In particular, a present tense sentence would
have the LF in (10a) (where the T head only contains a pointer to the time of ut-
terance N), while the past tense counterpart would have the LF in (10b), involving
additional covert temporal operators.
(10) a. [[T n ] [my dogs are in the basket]]
b. [[T ONCE [ PAST N] [ my dogs are in the basket ]]
Importantly, (10b) is more complex and in fact contains (10a). This, in combi-
nation with a structural theory of alternatives (Katzir 2007; Fox & Katzir 2011;
Trinh & Haida 2015) immediately predicts that (10a) can be an alternative of
(10b), but not vice versa. This is because under such approaches to alternatives,
a sentence can have its subparts as alternatives but not vice versa. In other words,
this structural asymmetry ensures that the present tense sentence is an alternative
of the past tense one, but the latter is not an alternative of the former. This, in
turn, correctly predicts that (10b) (i.e. (6)) can have the negation of (10a) (i.e. (7))
as an inference (given our description of the derivation of inferences above), while
(10a)/(7) cannot give rise to the negation of (10b)/(6) as an inference.
In sum, the two approaches outlined above derive the asymmetry between a
present tense sentence and its past counterpart with respect to temporal inferences
in quite diﬀerent ways. We turn next to the developmental predictions of these ap-
proaches, which diverge given recent hypotheses regarding children’s performance
on scalar implicatures.
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3 A developmental alternatives-based hypoth-
esis
A fairly robust finding in the developmental literature on scalar implicatures is that
4–6-year-old children tend to diﬀer from adults in how they respond to underinfor-
mative scalar sentences. For example, several earlier studies observed that children
tend to respond to underinformative sentences containing scalar terms like disjunc-
tion and the existential quantifier “some” on the basis of a literal interpretation,
rather than one that includes the relevant scalar implicature (see Noveck 2001;
Chierchia et al. 2001; Papafragou & Musolino 2003; Guasti et al. 2005, among
many others). In one of the earliest studies, Noveck (2001) presented participants
with sentences such as (11), which gives rise to the scalar implicature that not
all giraﬀes have long necks. This implicature is falsified by common knowledge,
and so participants were expected to reject the sentence if they computed the
implicature.
(11) Some giraﬀes have long necks.
Noveck observed that child participants rejected statements like (11) less often
than adults did, and took this as evidence that preschool-aged children derive
fewer scalar inferences than adults. This behavioral diﬀerence between children
and adults has since been replicated.
More recent studies have revealed that there are certain inferences that children
can compute at adult-like rates, in contrast to their performance on standard cases
like the some-not-all implicature. One such example is the so-called ‘free choice’
inference, investigated by Tieu et al. (2016). Consider the sentence in (12a) and
its associated inference in (12b):
(12) a. Jack can have cake or ice cream.
b.  Jack can have cake and Jack can have ice cream
The inference in (12b) is traditionally referred to as a ‘free choice inference’,
the intuition being that the sentence in (12a) grants Jack free choice between
the two options of cake and ice cream. Such inferences have received a scalar
inference analysis in the formal semantics literature (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002;
Alonso Ovalle 2005; Fox 2007; Klinedinst 2007; Chemla 2009; Santorio &
Romoli To appear), which we return to below. Tieu et al. (2016) investigated
children’s interpretation of modal statements containing disjunction (in Mandarin)
and ‘any’ (in English). Both sentence types give rise to free choice inferences.
Tieu et al. observed that children computed free choice inferences around 90% of
the time, whereas they computed standard implicatures involving plain disjunction
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(“or”/“and”) and modals (“may”/“must”) at typically low rates. In addition to
free choice inferences, children have been reported to compute a handful of other
inferences at adult-like rates, including the exactly-n inference of numerals (Barner
& Bachrach 2010; Papafragou & Musolino 2003), ad hoc implicatures (Barner
et al. 2011; Stiller et al. 2015), ignorance inferences (Hochstein et al. 2016), and
various inferences of simple and embedded disjunctions (Singh et al. 2016; Tieu
et al. 2017).
The seeming variability in children’s performance on implicatures (i.e. their rela-
tively poorer performance on implicatures involving plain disjunction, the quantiifer
“some”, and the weak modal “may”/“might”, compared to their strong performance
on free choice, ad hoc, and numeral implicatures) has led to much recent discus-
sion in the developmental literature. One recent developmental proposal aims to
capture children’s variable performance by appealing to the nature of the alterna-
tives required to compute the relevant inferences. Specifically, the inferences on
which children perform at non-adult-like levels tend to involve lexical alternatives
(e.g., “some” vs. “all”, “or” vs. “and”, “may” vs. “must”), while the inferences that
children are able to compute at adult-like levels involve alternatives that can be
retrieved from the context or the sentence itself (see the ‘Restricted Alternatives
Hypothesis’ proposed in Tieu et al. 2016 as well as discussion in Barner et al. 2011;
Singh et al. 2016; Tieu et al. 2017, among others).
Under this approach, children diﬀer from adults in computing scalar implica-
tures because they struggle to access the alternatives required for the computation
of the relevant implicatures. This is supported by the finding that children in fact
readily compute inferences for which the relevant alternatives are easily accessible
or salient in the context (Barner et al. 2011; Tieu et al. 2016; Singh et al. 2016;
Tieu et al. 2017, among others; see also discussion in Skordos & Papafragou 2016
for the role of the relevance of the required alternatives). Take the case of the
free choice inference. On the implicature approach to free choice inferences, the
inference in (13b) is derived through the negation of the ‘substring’ alternatives
in (13c) and (13d) (if it’s false that Jack is restricted to cake and it’s false that
Jack is restricted to ice cream, it follows that he can have the cake and he can
have the ice cream).
(13) a. Jack can have cake or ice cream.
b.  Jack can have cake and Jack can have ice cream
c. Jack can only have cake.
d. Jack can only have ice cream.
Given the alternatives are provided as substrings of the assertion, children are
not required to have lexicalized the scalar alternatives, nor do they have to re-
10 Kane, Cremers, Tieu, Kennedy, Sudo, Folli, Romoli
trieve scalar alternatives from the lexicon. In contrast to the free choice inference,
consider a traditional implicature like (14b) from (14a). The not-all implicature
requires that the child access the stronger scalar term “all” upon hearing “some”,
a term that is not contained within the original assertion.
(14) a. Some of my dogs jumped on the bed.
b.  Not all of my dogs jumped on the bed
Summarizing, the alternatives-based hypothesis locates the source of children’s
variable behavior in the nature of the alternatives involved in implicature compu-
tation. For our purposes, the most relevant prediction of this approach is that
children should perform at adult-like levels on scalar implicatures for which the
relevant alternatives are structurally contained within the assertion. As we will see
in the next subsection, assuming the alternatives-based hypothesis, the semantic
and structural approaches to temporal inferences described above make divergent
predictions for how children should perform on temporal inferences.
4 The case of negated adverbial modifiers: A
baseline
Sentences containing negated adverbial modifiers, such as (15a), tend to give rise
to the inference that the corresponding unmodified positive sentence is true; for
instance, (15a) suggests quite robustly that my dogs did jump (Simons 2001;
Katzir 2007; Schlenker 2008).
(15) a. My dogs didn’t jump high.
b.  My dogs jumped
The inference in (15b) is typically analyzed as a scalar implicature arising from the
negation of the simpler alternative in (16), i.e. the sentence without the adverbial
modifier (Katzir 2007). As (16) is more informative than (15a), the hearer will
reason along the lines above and conclude that (16) is false, thereby concluding
(15b).
(16) My dogs didn’t jump.
This kind of explanation also extends to analogous inferences arising in other
downward-entailing contexts, as shown by Katzir (2007). What is crucial for our
purposes is that the inference of the negated adverbial modifier arises from an
alternative that is structurally contained within the assertion, as shown in (17a)
and (17b).
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(17) a. [not[my dogs [jumped [high]]]]
b. [not[my dogs [jumped]]]
This inference therefore presents a straightforward test of the alternatives-based
hypothesis. Children are expected to compute this inference at an adult-like rate,
since the required alternative is easily retrievable from the assertion itself. The
inference of negated adverbial modifiers will therefore provide a reasonable baseline
for comparison with temporal inferences, on the one hand, and the standard lexical
scale-based implicature of “some”, on the other hand.
5 Predictions
The two theories of temporal inferences that we have discussed both manage to
capture the relevant temporal inference that arises from past tense sentences like
(6). When we turn to child language, however, we see that the two theories make
divergent predictions for how children should perform on temporal inferences.
Let us consider first the STRUCTURAL approach, which assumes that a present
tense sentence is structurally contained within its corresponding past tense one.
This assumption, in combination with a developmental alternatives-based hypoth-
esis leads to the prediction in (18) that children should be more adult-like in their
computation of temporal inferences, compared to how they perform on classical
scalar implicatures.
(18) Prediction of the STRUCTURAL approach: Children will display more
adult-like behavior on temporal inferences than on standard scalar impli-
catures involving lexical replacement.
Under the SEMANTIC approach, on the other hand, temporal inferences arise as a
regular implicature. Crucially, this theory does not make any assumptions about the
structural relationship between the past tense sentence and its present counterpart.
There is, therefore, no expectation that children should be more or less adult-
like on temporal inferences compared to other implicatures. If anything, without
further assumptions about the syntax of these sentences, this approach instead
predicts that children should display similar performance on temporal inferences
and classical scalar implicatures, or at least that they might diﬀer from adults in
the same way on the two inferences (see Tieu et al. Under review and Renans
et al. 2017 for discussion of a similar ‘uniformity’ prediction in the domain of
plurality inferences). That is, if children diﬀer from adults, they should diﬀer to
the same degree for temporal inferences and standard implicatures; there is no
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specific theoretical reason to expect that they should fare better (i.e. be more
adult-like) on one inference compared to another:5
(19) Prediction of the SEMANTIC approach: The diﬀerence that is ob-
served between children and adults on standard implicatures, if any, should
also be observed for temporal inferences.
In sum, comparing temporal inferences to classical scalar implicatures, the struc-
tural approach predicts an interaction between group and inference type, with
children performing more like adults on temporal inferences than on standard im-
plicatures (that require lexical replacement). On the other hand, the semantic
account predicts no such interaction.
To test the predictions above, we designed an experiment to test children and
adults on temporal inferences, the standard not all implicature of the quantifier
“some”, and the inferences of negated adverbial modifiers. The case of “some”
provides a baseline inference on which children are expected to diﬀer from adults,
as the inference requires the lexical replacement of alternatives. The case of
the negated adverbial modifier involves alternatives that are contained within the
assertion, and therefore provides a baseline inference for which we expect to observe
more adult-like behavior from children, since no lexical replacement of alternatives
is required.
To summarize, we have two inferences that will serve as a baseline against
which temporal inferences will be compared, one involving replacement of lexical
alternatives, as in (20), and one involving non-replacement alternatives, as in (21).
(20) a. Some of my dogs jumped.
b. All of my dogs jumped. REPLACEMENT ALTERNATIVE
c.  Not all of my dogs jumped
(21) a. My dogs didn’t jump high.
b. My dogs didn’t jump. NON-REPLACEMENT ALTERNATIVE
c.  My dogs jumped
5 As an anonymous reviewer points out, one could supplement the SEMANTIC approach with an as-
sumption about saliency of alternatives, for instance that temporal alternatives are simply more
salient to children than the alternative of some. This has been proposed in the case of numerals,
where children’s performance is typically more adult-like compared to their performance on other
scalar terms (Papafragou & Musolino 2003, among others). Unlike the case of numerals, however,
where children are explicitly taught the numeral scale from an early age, and therefore might plau-
sibly be more familiar with the alternatives, it is not clear to us why temporal alternatives should
be more salient for children than scalar quantifier alternatives. Without independent justification for
distinguishing among these alternatives through salience, we therefore identify the main prediction
of the SEMANTIC approach as that in (19).
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Given this three-way comparison, the structural approach, in combination
with the developmental alternatives-based hypothesis, gives rise to the prediction
in (22).
(22) Prediction of structural approach in combination with alternatives-
based hypothesis: Children’s performance on temporal inferences and
negated adverbial modifiers should be more adult-like than their perfor-
mance on the not all implicature of “some”.
We turn now to our experiment, which tested the prediction in (22).
6 Experiment
We tested the predictions outlined in Section 5 by comparing the performance of a
group of 4–6-year-old children with a group of adults on temporal inferences, the
classical scalar implicature of “some”, and negative sentences involving adverbial
modification.
6.1 Methods
6.1.1 Participants
38 English-speaking children (4;02–5;11, M=5;04) recruited from preschools in
Belfast and 40 English-speaking adults recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk
(age range 21–55) participated in the experiment. One child and four adults were
excluded from analysis because their error rate on control and filler items exceeded
25%, leaving a total of 37 children and 36 adults for analysis.
6.1.2 Procedure
We developed a novel task based on the sentence-to-picture-matching task em-
ployed in Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3), which involved matching a spoken
sentence to one of three picture alternatives featured in an animated video se-
quence.6 Participants watched a series of animated videos, each involving three
6 A pilot study using a truth value judgment task showed that adults were unwilling to reject sentences
like (1) when its literal meaning was true but its temporal inference was false. We thus moved to
a selection task, which intuitively made the reading with the implicature more attractive, but at
the time were not aware of the results reported in Katsos & Bishop (2011: Exp. 3). As we will
discuss further in the Discussion, our experiment did not replicate Katsos & Bishop’s findings for
the quantifier “some”: even with the selection task, the children we tested were not adult-like at
deriving the not all implicature.
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Figure 1: Sample answer sheet for collecting responses (children).
groups of characters (diﬀerently colored dogs, birds, divers, or ducks). The par-
ticipants’ task was to ’guess’ which colour characters belonged to Raﬃe based
on a clue that the puppet would give at the end of each video sequence. At the
beginning of each video sequence, the narrator introduced the characters on the
screen. A sample introduction is given below 7
(23) Narrator: There are three dogs playing in the room. See! Black dogs,
grey dogs and brown dogs. One of the three groups of dogs belongs to
Raﬃe, your job is to guess which colour dogs are his. Listen for the clue.
Once the characters had completed their animated actions, a bell would sound,
indicating that the puppet was about to provide a clue. The puppet then provided
a clue relating to the action. A sample clue from the adverbial modifier condition
is provided in (24).
(24) Puppet: My dogs didn’t jump high.
Participants were then asked to provide a response to the question ’Which dogs
belong to Raﬃe?’ Child participants provided their responses by placing stickers
on multiple choice answer sheets that corresponded to the characters on the screen
(see Figure 1). Adult participants provided their responses by clicking on one of
three response buttons indicating the colour associated with the group of dogs
they wanted to choose as their answer (e.g., ’Black’, ’Grey’, ’Brown’).
7 Testing with child particpants was done face to face with the narrations carried out by the individual
conducting the experiment. For adult participants, we developed an online version of the experi-
ment. An anonymized online version of the experiment can be found at http://spellout.net/ibexexps/
AnonymizedExps/SuB.
Testing theories of temporal inferences 15
Temporal Inference Scalar Implicature Adverbial modifier
Figure 2: Screen captures of target items in each condition.
6.1.3 Materials
The three groups of characters (Literal, Target, False) diﬀered in whether they
made the literal interpretation and the implicature of the sentence true or false.
The Literal group satisfied the literal interpretation of the puppet’s clue, but not
its implicature; the Target group was consistent with both the literal meaning and
the implicature of the puppet’s sentence. Deriving the appropriate inference was
thus necessary in order to distinguish between these two groups. The third group,
the False group, was a distractor that failed to satisfy the literal meaning of the
sentence; the inclusion of these distractors allowed us to check whether children
had correctly understood the task.
The target sentences and their respective implicatures are provided in (25)-
(27). Figure 2 provides sample screen shots of the target items for the TI, SI, and
AM conditions. In Table 1 we describe the animations for each character group.
Figure 3 provides an example of the visual display prior to and after the relevant
action for the TI condition.
(25) My dogs were in the basket.
 My dogs aren’t in the basket TEMPORAL INFERENCE (TI)
(26) Some of my dogs are in the basket.
 Not all of my dogs are in the basket SCALAR IMPLICATURE (SI)
(27) My dogs didn’t jump high.
 My dogs jumped ADVERBIAL MODIFIER UNDER NEGATION (AM)
Each participant received 23 trials in total: 4 repetitions of each target type,
6 control items that contained a Target Group and two distinct False Groups (2
for each target type), 2 present tense controls, and 3 fillers. Items were presented
in one of two pseudo-randomized orders, which ensured, among other things, that
the present tense controls never appeared before a TI target item (since this would
make the alternative contextually salient for the temporal inference). To make it
clear that the puppet’s use of the past tense could not refer to a time coinciding
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Target Group Literal Group False Group
Literal meaning: True True False
Inference: True False False
TI (25) in basket, then move in basket throughout never in basket
SI (26) some on the bed, some not all on the bed none on the bed
AM (27) jumped low didn’t jump jumped high
Table 1: Location of Target, Literal, and False groups during animation, for
each condition.
Before action (target group in basket) After action (target group on bed)
Figure 3: Example stimuli for the TI item “My dogs were in the basket”.
with the end state, the characters remained animated on the screen until a response
was provided.
6.2 Results
The mean error rate on control and filler items before exclusion of any participants
was 12% for adults and 6% for children, suggesting that the task did not pose any
particular diﬃculty. We then excluded four adult participants and one child whose
error rate was above 25% error rate. Figure 4 presents the proportion of Target,
Literal, and False group selections for the target items, by adults and children.
For statistical analysis, we excluded the False responses (under the assumption
that they reflected diﬃculty in understanding the stimuli/situation and not the
target sentence) and focused on Target and Literal responses on the target trials.
The dependent variable was therefore a two-level categorical variable. Figure 5
provides a boxplot displaying each participant’s behavior once False responses are
excluded. A mixed-eﬀects binomial logistic regression model was fitted to the
data predicting the probability of a Target response as a function of Condition
(TI, SI or AM, treatment-coded with TI as a baseline), Group (child vs. adult,
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Figure 4: Percentages of group selections per condition.
sum-coded), and their interaction. We included random slopes for Condition and
further simplified the random eﬀects structure following the recommendations of
Bates et al. (2015).8 The detailed results are provided in Table 2.
Estimate z-value p-value
(Intercept) 0.6 1.6 0.102
[Condition:AM] 1.5 3.4 <.001 ???
[Condition:SI] 2.4 4.0 <.001 ???
[Group] -1.5 -2.4 0.015 ?
[Condition:AM][Group] -.06 -0.1 0.920
[Condition:SI][Group] -2.2 -2.3 0.022 ?
Table 2: Results of binomial logistic regression model on participants’ responses
to targets (excluding False responses)..
The model revealed a main eﬀect of Condition, indicating that participants
overall selected the Target more often in the AM and SI conditions than in the TI
condition. There was also a main eﬀect of Group, showing that adults selected the
8 More concretely, after fitting a maximal model in the sense of Barr et al. (2013), we ran a principal
component analysis on the random effects and refitted the model, keeping only components which
explained at least 5% of the variance explained by the main component. The selection of components
for Subject and Item random effects was done independently, as the random effects for Item tend to
be much smaller. The final ‘parsimonious’ model included two Subject random effects and one Item
random effect.
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Figure 5: Percent Target group selection against Literal group selection for
individual participants. Error bars correspond to standard errors.
Target group more often than children in the TI condition. Crucially, there was a
significant interaction between Group and Condition when comparing the TI and
SI conditions, but no such interaction when comparing the TI and AM conditions,
indicating that children were equally adult-like on the AM and TI conditions, but
were significantly less adult-like in the SI condition.
7 Discussion
The current study employed a novel animated selection paradigm building on
Katsos & Bishop (2011). We investigated the developmental predictions of the
STRUCTURAL and SEMANTIC approaches to temporal inferences by comparing
the performance of a group of 4–6-year-old children and a group of adults on
temporal inferences like in (28), the classical not all implicature of the quantifier
“some” in (29), and the inference of negated adverbial modifiers, like (30).
(28) My dogs were in the basket.
 My dogs aren’t in the basket
(29) Some of my dogs are in the basket.
 Not all of my dogs are in the basket
(30) My dogs didn’t jump high.
 My dogs jumped
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The results of our experiment reveal that overall, children computed all three
inference types at a lower rate than the adult controls. Importantly, however,
while children diﬀered from adults across inference types, they were more adult-
like on temporal inferences and the inferences of adverbial modifiers than on scalar
implicatures. In particular, we found an interaction between group and inference
type when comparing temporal inferences and the implicature of some, but no such
interaction when comparing temporal inferences with the inference of adverbial
modifiers. The children’s data overall supports the alternatives-based hypothesis
we discussed in Section 3: children were relatively more adult-like on adverbial
modification, which does not require any lexical replacement of alternatives, while
they performed relatively worse on the implicature of “some’ ’which requires the
lexical replacement of “some” with “all”. Moreover, the finding that children were
equally adult-like on adverbial modification and temporal inferences lends support
to a structural approach to temporal inferences along the lines of Thomas (2012).
Under such an approach, the present tense sentence is structurally contained within
its corresponding past tense one, and no lexical replacement of alternatives is
required to derive the inference.
A further finding of the current study is that both children and adults computed
fewer temporal inferences overall than either scalar implicatures or adverbial infer-
ences. This observed variability across inference types is somewhat reminiscent of
recent work indicating that adults compute diﬀerent scalar implicatures at varying
rates (van Tiel et al. 2016). However, as discussed below, our forced-choice selec-
tion task should minimize such variation because it rewards the derivation of any
relevant inference. While we do not have a definitive explanation for the observed
diﬀerence, we suspect it may come from uncertainty as to which time counts as
‘present’ in the context of the task; despite our eﬀorts, some participants may
have anchored the whole story in the past, and this would have made the temporal
inference irrelevant. The lower rate of Target responses in adults further compli-
cates the interpretation of our results. First, with varying baselines, the statistical
estimates for interactions become dependent on the choice of link function in the
binomial model. We verified that our results held with probit, Cauchy CDF, and
complementary log-log links, so we are confident that the observed pattern of inter-
action is not an artifact of the logit link function. Second, and more problematic,
we cannot rule out that the low rates of target choices in adults and children have
diﬀerent sources. For instance, one might imagine that adults are more likely than
children to anchor the story in the past, while the low rate of Target responses
in children mostly reflects diﬃculty with the derivation of the temporal inference.
As a consequence, our conclusion relies on the assumption that whatever caused
a low rate of Target responses in adults had the same eﬀect on children, such that
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the interaction with the SI and AM conditions only measures children’s specific
diﬃculty with the derivation of the implicature.
Notice that the finding that children computed fewer implicatures from “some”
than adults diverges from the results reported in Katsos & Bishop (2011), who
found children to be adult-like on “some” in their selection paradigm. Our finding of
non-adult-like behavior is more consistent with previous studies that have used the
more traditional binary truth value judgment task (e.g., Papafragou & Musolino
2003). One potential reason for the diﬀerence in findings might be a matter of
sample size: we tested 38 children, while Katsos and Bishop tested 15 children
in their selection paradigm. A more interesting reason for the discrepancy in
findings could be that Katsos & Bishop (2011) included “all” controls, while we
were careful not to include the scalar alternatives required for the derivation of
the target inferences. While these factors may not entirely explain the divergent
findings, they could partially explain why children appeared to be relatively more
adult-like in Katsos & Bishop’s experiment compared to ours.
Finally, let us consider the use of the selection paradigm in the context of
an existing explanation for children’s performance on implicatures. As we have
already observed, the selection paradigm seems to be well-suited for capturing
inferences that are not strong enough to trigger pure rejection in a standard bi-
nary truth value judgment task. In fact, Katsos & Bishop (2011) propose that
a binary judgment task might underestimate children’s ability to compute impli-
catures. This is because, as they propose, children are more pragmatically toler-
ant of underinformative statements than adults are, leading them to accept an
implicature-violating sentence in a binary truth value judgment task, even if they
are able to derive the implicature. While the selection paradigm does seem to
be better suited at capturing weaker inferences like the temporal inference, the
children we tested nevertheless displayed diﬃculties with implicatures that may
not be fully explained by the notion of pragmatic tolerance. In principle, the se-
lection task should help to circumvent this issue because it strongly encourages
the derivation of an inference, since the literal meaning is not suﬃcient to narrow
down the choice to a single answer. By contrast, the truth value judgment task
requires participants to make a binary choice between accepting an underinforma-
tive utterance or rejecting it on the basis of pragmatic considerations. Similarly,
the covered-box paradigm (see Huang et al. 2013 and Pearson et al. 2011), which
has also been used to test for the derivation of inferences, also requires partici-
pants to make a binary choice between accepting a sub-optimal picture or opting
for the unknown covered one (participants must choose the visible picture if it is
compatible with the target sentence, and the covered picture otherwise). In our
selection paradigm, the choice is much easier: after accessing the literal reading
of the puppet’s statement, participants can rule out the False group, but would
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not at that point be able to make a choice between the two remaining groups.
Stopping here would require them to make a random choice between the Literal
and Target groups (or base their choice on other, non-linguistic considerations),
and this might then push them to derive any inference that could help them to
decide amongst the pictured groups. In a sense, this task translates the pragmatic
violation that ensues from the use of an underinformative statement into a very
concrete communication failure in the absence of the implicature, penalizing par-
ticipants who do not derive an implicature by requiring them to find other cues to
make a choice. Nevertheless, we observed diﬀerences between children and adults
on the target inferences, suggesting pragmatic tolerance might not be the entire
explanation.
8 Conclusion
The current study employed a novel animated selection paradigm to investigate
the developmental predictions of the STRUCTURAL and SEMANTIC approaches to
temporal inferences. The results of our experiment reveal that overall, children
computed all three inference types at a lower rate than the adult controls, but
they were more adult-like on temporal inferences and the inferences of adverbial
modifiers than on the scalar implicature of “some”, which requires the lexical re-
placement of “some” with “all”. We discussed the implications of the findings, both
for a developmental alternatives-based hypothesis, which posits that children’s dif-
ficulties with certain implicatures arise from a diﬃculty in accessing the required
lexical alternatives, as well as for theories of temporal inferences, arguing that the
finding that children were more (and equally) adult-like on temporal inferences and
adverbial modifiers supports a structural theory of temporal inferences along the
lines of Thomas (2012).
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